Archive

Tag Archives: Trilateral


Japan is Back on the World Stage

image-2018-02-02_7

The National Interest, Nottingham_iAPS, 4 February, 2018

Just over a month after the foreign and defence ministers of Britain and Japan stood side-by-side in the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich in December 2017, Japan’s foreign minister, Taro Kano, and defence minister, Itsunori Onodera, were standing with their French counterparts in Tokyo. As with the UK-Japan 2+2, the meeting focused on maritime security, with their joint statement calling for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and reiterating their “common interest” in the rules-based order. The two meetings are in themselves striking by the number of nodes that match: the United States and Japan are strong allies; the United Kingdom and France have strong defence links; France, the United States and the United Kingdom are strong NATO member states; and the United Kingdom and the United States are in the Five Eyes with Australia, a country that now has defence bilateral links with Japan, the United Kingdom and France.

As I’ve written elsewhere, the much-vaunted diminishment of the liberal rules-based order—much of it at the hands of Beijing and Moscow—has become a defining feature of the age. Just a few years ago, pundits sought to frame international relations with the more prosaic-sounding “rise of the rest” and there were suitable and necessary debates on how the rules-based order should evolve to match the new power realities. Those debates were right and proper, and even morally necessary for the system to maintain coherence and legitimacy. After 2014, much of what should have been about rules-based evolution became power-based revolution. In February 2014, Russia “annexed” Crimea, and their “Little Green Men” marched into eastern Ukraine, breaking the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. In early September 2014, Chinese vessels began “reclamation” work on Johnson South Reef, a part of a busy shipping route to which they had no legal right.

While statements have been made to condemn these events, the fact is that the West is dismayed and confused in how to react. The election of a nonconformist president on trade and Brexit have not helped. Nonetheless, it is clear from the France-Japan 2+2 and the UK-Japan 2+2 that liberal democracies are beginning to band together. Not, as some would have it, to “contain” China, but rather to attempt to deter further adventurism and to buttress the rules-based aspect of the order. One can also see this in the scope and content of the U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral and the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral.

What has perhaps been most remarkable about these groupings is the pivotal role played by Japan in them. After all, as recently as 1991, Japan had no close security partners besides the United States, and remained entrenched and immobilized by the pacifist Constitution and foreign policy that it had inherited from the postwar settlement. China and the Koreas notwithstanding, the revival of Japanese hard power and diplomacy has been welcomed and encouraged by the United States, Australia, and India as a return to normalcy—an unsurprising reintroduction of Japan to the family of nations. This has also characterized the views of many of those Japanese leaders inside the LDP, Japan’s ruling party, including Junichiro Koizumi, Taro Aso and Shinzo Abe. While Koizumi is the first post-Yoshida Prime Minister of Japan, Abe has been in many ways, the most revolutionary and dynamic in terms of Japan’s security policy regionally but also in Europe.

Under Abe’s watch, Japan has not only passed significant legislation developing a national security apparatus, he has also passed legislation allowing for collective security with regional partners and introduced intelligence reforms that inhibit espionage inside the country. It is said that Japan is on the cusp of far-ranging intelligence reforms as well, particularly centred around the creation of a civilian-led intelligence agency, overseen by some sort of parliamentary process. Much of this has been done in consultation with those countries that Japan considers partners if not allies, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and of course, the United States.

Japan’s push into Europe is now said to be beginning in earnest and one can see this in a number of ways. First of all, Japan and the EU are going to sign a free trade agreement—it is said, by the summer. This will immediately push Japan past China, South Korea, and even the United States, in the EU’s estimation as an economic partner of significance. China is currently the second largest partner, while the United States is the first largest partner, with Japan coming in at a modest seventh place. Layered atop this new economic importance to Europe, Japan’s ties with France and United Kingdom are proceeding steadily.

The France-Japan 2+2 began in 2014, the same year that China and Russia began to use military force to challenge the rules based order. The following year, the UK-Japan 2+2 began meeting. Both bilaterals bear more than a striking resemblance to the Japan-Australia bilateral in that they remain noncommittal, but nevertheless seek to institutionalize cooperation in the types of sectors traditionally reserved for close allies. Thus, both London and Paris have agreed to Arms Transfer Agreements with Tokyo, allowing for greater defence collaboration at the defence industrial level. With France, the Japanese are exploring a possible undersea mine-clearing UAV, while with the United Kingdom, the Japanese have looked into putting Mitsubishi Electric sensors into the British Meteor missile. Since both are top-tier partners on the American F-35 programme, they are now carrying out a study to see if the resulting missile will be interoperable with the fighter.

There have also been a number of other small steps. The United Kingdom, for example, signed a logistics agreement in 2015 known as an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The ACSA enables British forces and their Japanese counterparts to exchange food, fuel, ammunition and carry out other logistical practices together. The defining purpose is interoperability. While France and Japan have not yet signed an ACSA, their joint statement implied that progress was being made on the logistical agreement.

So what are the drivers for Japan in all this? Well, as has been mentioned, insecurity has played the primary role. Tokyo sees these security partnerships and defence industrial collaboration as a way of developing quasi-alliance ties with a number of Western states as a means of balancing against what may become a threatening Chinese rise. But not all is grand strategy. Japan faces—like other advanced economies—defence inflation, that’s to say the growing research and development costs of defence industrial capacity. One need only look at the computing power of the most recent advanced fighters, compared to their ancestors sixty years ago. In moving towards mid-sized defence industrial powers, like France and the United Kingdom, Japan is clearly looking to pick up tips on how to make a leaner R&D process, how to create open tenders and how to structure the acquisition process internally. The question will be of course, whether these security partnerships morph into full-blown alliances. At their present state, it is not clear that they are sufficient to buttress the much-needed rules-based order.

Advertisements

Diplomatic initiative revived to counter China’s growing influence

The Financial Times, Kiran Stacy, Jamie Smyth, 14 November, 2017

“John Hemmings, director of the Asia Studies Centre at the Henry Jackson Society, a foreign policy think-tank, says: ‘We must ask ourselves: by avoiding collective security arrangements in 2008, did we persuade China to behave as a model citizen in the region?'”

To read the full article, please click here.


A Reborn Quadrilateral to Deter China

The Interpreter, 9 November, 2017

j_OiSu-y

Recent news that Australia’s Foreign Minister has indicated interest in taking part in a resurrected US-Australia-Japan-India quadrilateral dialogue on the sidelines of the upcoming ASEAN Summit is to be welcomed. It is an indication how much the strategic situation in the Asia Pacific has shifted. Positive as this latest development might be, it should nonetheless be regarded with caution.

The ‘Quadrilateral’ was never an alliance. It was a loose geostrategic alignment of states concerned with China’s potential challenge to their interests, but simultaneously, unwilling to provoke China by assuming the obligatory mechanisms of an alliance. Even then it buckled under pressure. Accused of being a NATO-in-the-making, it was far too full of self-doubt to be effective.

Chinese diplomatic opposition to the forum was keenly felt in June 2007 after Beijing issued demarches to all four countries, but Canberra’s asymmetric economic dependence meant that Australia felt it more than most. Within months of winning the election in 2007, Kevin Rudd’s Foreign Minister Stephen Smith unilaterally withdrew Australia from the quadrilateral during a February 2008 meeting with China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. While Australia was not the only country suffering internal divisions about the issue – there were doubters among the senior-most levels of the US Department of State and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs – it was the first to break ranks.

At the root of Australia’s indecision has been something common to all the great and middle powers in the region: how to apportion China a regional leadership role while attempting to shape its choices away from illiberal or hegemonic designs.

Sadly, in the years since, China has shown ever-increasing signs of assertiveness in its approach to the region. It has used military coercion and an unprecedented militarisation of maritime sea lanes in the South China Sea; its strategy is both at odds with regional practice and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Despite regional attempts to resolve disputed maritime claims peacefully, Beijing has cynically played for time over the establishment of a Code of Conduct while using economic leverage to prevent ASEAN unanimity.

China’s geostrategic ambitions have become global with the massive, multi-billion dollar, decades-long Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It promises a new age of Chinese leverage over the Asian heartland, as well as a real attempt at internationalising the RMB without giving over political control.

No doubt, this dialogue on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit will feel the full weight of China’s diplomatic pressure. Even in announcing its openness to a meeting, Bishop’s language was ambiguous: ‘…it’s natural that we should continue to have such discussions, but there is nothing formal. There is no decision on that.’ Chinese diplomats are likely to issue demarches and make phone calls to all four capitals.

While no one wishes to have a China backed into a corner, fearful of a NATO in Asia, is that really what is taking place? From one perspective, a rising power with quasi-hegemonic designs is trying to prevent a loose coalition of states from organising themselves in a constraining and deterring bloc. And while it is absolutely in China’s interests to do that, is it in ours to acquiesce?

If the quadrilateral format is embraced, the four may find that despite initial protests, Beijing will ultimately accept that each have their own interests and the power to define those interests. This week we have seen Beijing accept – after a year of diplomatic pressure – Seoul’s decision to deploy THAAD missile-defence systems on its soil. South Korea stuck to its ground while simultaneously seeking to ameliorate China’s concerns, eventually winning China over.

The quadrilateral members should adopt that lesson as their own. We must ask ourselves: by avoiding collective security arrangements in 2008, did we persuade China to behave as a model citizen in the region? We must choose actions that meet our own strategic concerns and not China’s. For this reason, the quadrilateral makes sense.


America, Japan and the UK: A New Three-Way Alliance?

hemmings[1]

With Chris Bew, Researcher, Henry Jackson Society

The National Interest, 4 April, 2017

In January 2016, standing on the flight deck of the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier based in Japan, the UK defence secretary, Michael Fallon, spoke of Washington’s commitment to a “three-way alliance” between the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States. He stated that the three countries would develop their commitment to interoperability by working closely together in the future. This is significant because it comes at a time when there are serious questions about stability in the region, and when the East and South China Seas may become crucial issues in relations between Beijing, Washington and Tokyo.

Putting this rhetoric into practice, on October 20, 2016, the chief of the Japanese Maritime Force and the chiefs of the British and U.S. navies sat across the table from each other at the Pentagon to sign a trilateral cooperation agreement. This agreement commits all three navies to closer cooperation, with increased exercises and joint patrols in the future. Signed at the service-level, this agreement sets forth a roadmap for what it calls “mutually desired strategic effects.”

<!–

–>Why Team Up?
In the context of an increasingly uncertain world, we are seeing more and more states aligning with each other in non-traditional security relationships at the global level. These alignments are non-traditional in the sense that they are not formal alliances, but rather informal and ever-expanding arrangements. Covering a host of different areas, they are in many ways a reaction to the complex level of threats facing liberal democracies these days. Considering Britain’s imminent departure from the European Union, forming alliances with other powerful nations around the world is fundamental. With the United Kingdom, United States and Japan each being liberal democracies and having vested interests in the maintenance of the international rules-based system, they make natural bedfellows.

 

UK-Japan Relations
Focusing closer on the relationship between the UK and Japan, the current bastion of UK-Japan security cooperation is the 2+2 meetings. These have been held annually since 2015. At these meetings, the foreign and defence secretaries from both sides come together, usually for two days of meetings, to discuss a range of common areas of interest. The 2+2 arrangement allows both states to talk about areas of common concern, which allows them to signal both each other, and third-party states about their intentions and interests.

During the January 2016 2+2, both countries affirmed their support for the rule of law in the East and South China Seas. They also expressed a full commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty, adding their concern over North Korea’s missile and nuclear program. To those listening, the 2+2 is perhaps a hint of the security preferences of both the UK and Japan. Other purposes of the 2+2 meetings include helping to socialise each other towards common security interests and enabling both countries to create a framework for bilateral security cooperation.

In the last January 2017 2+2, both countries signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to facilitate closer bilateral defence logistics. This agreement will enable the two militaries to cooperate abroad on combined exercises and peacekeeping operations, alongside humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Ultimately, this will increase the efficiency of both country’s forces. So, for instance, British tankers will be able to refuel Japanese aircraft, or Japanese ships might be able to refuel British vessels, and so on. An ACSA is really the first step in the holy grail of interoperability for conventional militaries. This agreement improves future cooperative expediency because it removes the need for further individual case-by-case agreements.

UK-Japan Future Cooperation
The tightening of UK-Japan relations comes at a time when rising powers in Asia-Pacific are causing critical uncertainty in the region and beyond. This has led to policymakers strengthening alliances around the world. The United Kingdom and Japan are a strong example of such an alliance that has been redoubled in recent years.

Another significant area of future cooperation between London and Tokyo includes a joint research project on Chemical and Biological Protection suits and other weapons systems. In an age of shrinking defence budgets and rising threats, it makes sense to partner with other liberal democracies, sharing useful technology and pooling precious research and development funding. This follows the success of the first round of talks of a new Joint New Air-to-Air Missile. This sharing of technology is significant because it builds a framework for ever-closer collaboration between both countries for the foreseeable future in a world where nations are choosing their alliances extremely carefully. In a time of growing insecurity, such partnerships are to be welcomed.


Quasi-Alliances, Managing the Rise of China, and Domestic Politics: The US-Japan-Australia Trilateral 1991-2015

London School of Economics PhD, September 2016

Of all the changes to power and diplomacy in the Asia Pacific over the past fifteen years, perhaps one of the most intriguing and under-researched has been the gradual proliferation of a new type of security cooperation, the trilateral. As an area of research, the trilateral has fallen between the cracks of rising power debates centered around China’s rise, hegemonic stability discussions, debates on the future of the American “hub and spokes system”, and Southeast Asian community-building and regional order studies. Despite the relative paucity in research, the trilateral model has replicated itself throughout the region, popping up between allies and even between peer competitors, fulfilling a range of functions; from political and economic, as with the China-ROK-Japan Trilateral Summit; to strategic and political, as with the Australia-India-Japan trilateral.

Some are extra-regional in focus, as with the US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue; some are primarily regional in focus, as with the US-Japan-Australia Security Dialogue; and some are primarily sub-regional in focus, as with the US-Japan-ROK model. As the past four examples show, the United States has been a particularly prominent builder of trilateral relationships, developing three trilaterals around its Asia-Pacific alliance partners. Often, it has sought to link up allies with which it already has strong bilateral ties, but who lack their own bilateral, such as Australia and Japan.

Often, as a result, the difference between bilateral and trilateral cooperation has been muddied, so much, that Desmond Ball, a prominent Australian scholar, has said:
“it is often difficult and sometimes even impossible to distinguish purely bilateral activities from the myriad of multilateral activities in which Australia and Japan are engaged, and particularly from collaborative activities undertaken as part of the respective alliance arrangements with the United States.”

This muddying of waters does not just cover what the trilaterals do, but also what the
trilaterals are, since they lack one of the primary features of alliances, a formal or informal defence commitment between two allies. Noting this, William Tow – a prominent Australian scholar of trilateralism – describes them as a “unique theoretical challenge” for the international relations scholar, demanding either a redefinition of alliances or a redefinition of security cooperation…

To read further, please click here.


The ‘China’ Role of the US-Japan Trilaterals

The National Interest, December 6, 2015

151116-N-AV746-116

Asia’s immense economic growth over recent decades has come in tandem with a large increase in insecurity and military spending. Partly in response, the region has seen a quiet revolution in U.S. Asia-Pacific policy as the ‘hub and spokes’ system has been integrated across U.S. ally partners and external powers. The United States and Japan, for example, have developed a number of on-going trilateral security arrangements with states in Asia, including Australia, India and South Korea. All partner countries regularly deny that these groupings are formal alliances, and lacking formal defence commitments in the third dyad (Japan-Australia, Japan-India, Japan-ROK), they are more precisely forms of alignment, not dissimilar to the Triple Entente of pre-1914.

Not only are trilaterals more ad hoc and flexible than alliances, but they are driven by a complex range of factors. They are partly driven by a strand of neoliberal optimism from the late 1990s, as well as by a more realist strand of pessimism found in the early 2000s. The most mature of these groupings, the US-Japan-Australia trilateral Strategic dialogue (TSD) has focused on “human security” activities, such as peacekeeping, capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. This side of their nature stems from their neoliberal optimism that they can be the building blocks of an integrated security community in Asia, and are part of an inclusive approach to former Cold War adversities, like Vietnam and China. To allied partners like Japan and Australia, the activities are important for “anchoring” the United States to the region, and have allowed both alliances a certain amount of legitimacy by providing “public goods,” while carefully avoiding a security dilemma with China.

On the other hand, the trilaterals also have a hard balancing element: the US-Japan-Australia TSD has included defence-industrial cooperation, the institutionalization of intelligence-sharing and growing military interoperability. With this double logic, they are a classic hedging strategy, as envisioned by political scientist Evan Medeiros. They encourage engagement, integrating regional militaries towards common objectives, as well as provide a form of insurance if Chinese revanchism begins to threaten regional stability. This hedging element is not incidental, but has evolved over time, to match rising Chinese assertiveness and the needs (and concerns) of the trilateral partner states.

The trilaterals are not—as China might think—a means of containment. Rather, they act like a restraining woven paper cup, loosely form-fitting. As one expands one’s hand in the basket, the material naturally tightens around it.

In many ways, it is the ultimate moral high ground, since the cup only tightens in reaction to expansion. In this way, as China continues to expand its power projection capabilities and attempts to expand its territoriality into the East and South China Seas, the trilaterals will continue to tighten around it and create the exact reaction that Deng Xiaoping once hoped to avoid.

The revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines are one aspect of that weaving, as are growing Japan-Philippines and Japan-Vietnam capacity-building behaviors in maritime security.

In some ways, this process is neatly described by the security dilemma in Thomas Christensen’s International Security essays. However, there is one material difference. The United States and its allies have helped China rise by investing trillions of dollars over the past three decades and by promoting Chinese inclusion in almost every important regional and global fora. No one could argue that the alliance partners have not done all they can to make China welcome and included in regional politics. Unlike Christensen’s neutral analysis, the increasing constrainment of China is driven by China’s own behaviour in much the way that occurred with pre-1914 Germany. Again, this is an important moral difference and highlights the reactive and defensive nature of the trilaterals.

Post-Bismarckian German foreign policy was unpredictable, expansionist and supported by a growth in nationalism and militarist culture. Similarly, Chinese revanchism is driven by a narrative of exclusion and regaining its “rightful place in the sun.” No one power—not even the United States—has the power to contain Chinese expansionism. However, an interlocking web of alliances around this struggling behemoth can deter it from unwise adventurism and act as a constraining influence. What happens next, of course, depends on China and its ultimate ambitions. States must understanding that in seeking to constrain China, they are not themselves acting dangerously or – as Hugh White might contend – recklessly. They are doing what they must to defend a rules-based order during a time of structural instability. The real recklessness would be in to appease the rolling ambitions of a newly-risen power, rather than seeking to shape and constrain them.


Understanding the US Pivot: Past, Present, and Future

RUSI Newsbrief, 26 November, 2014

Navy-Fleet1

With the resurrection of Russian revanchism on Europe’s Eastern borders and the near-collapse of the Iraqi and Kurdish states under the onslaught of ISIS, it seems as though the American pivot to Asia may be over before it has begun. Certainly, America’s ‘first Pacific President’, as he has been described, has found it more difficult than anticipated to end America’s wars in the Middle East and swing the country’s focus towards the Asia-Pacific.

The Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ to Asia was created during the re-election campaign by a group of the president’s closest advisors, with personal input by the president himself. Initiated with the prediction that Asia would become the centre of the global economy by 2050, by the belief that the US’s political absence had been bad for regional security, and by the notion that the US had become bogged down for too long in unwinnable wars in the Middle East. Emerging as a term to describe the US’s new Asia policy, a key assumption was that despite the challenges posed to the West by Islamists non-state actors and terrorist groups like Al-Qa’ida, these threats were manageable and the true focus of the US should instead be on Asia. The need for the US to shift its diplomatic, economic and defence resources to the region was perceived as especially urgent with the rise of Chinese regional power and influence, and China’s apparent inclination to exercise its burgeoning military power in territorial spats with its neighbours. The fact that these spats affected sea lanes vital to the US and its allies meant that their peaceful resolution was of direct concern to Washington. While these circumstances continue to exist, however, it is clear that growing insecurity in Europe and the Middle East mean that the US and its allies will now have to co-ordinate a much more holistic global strategy for the future.

In the three years since the pivot was unveiled, the policy has been much criticised, much maligned, and some would argue, much misunderstood. This is perhaps because it challenges a number of assumptions inherent to the ‘pre-pivot’ world. First, it challenges the notion that Europe is the global centre of gravity; second, it challenges the notion that the Middle East should be Washington’s overriding security priority; and third, it implicitly challenges the assumption that China will become the region’s lead power. At home, its domestic critics claim that the policy represents mere Democratic posturing, representing – at best – a simple repackaging of various Bush-era policies, including the trilaterals – a unique set of quasi-alliances with Japan, Australia, South Korea and India established between 2002 and 2010 – closer ties with Tokyo, and capability-building among Southeast Asian states. Why claim that the US would return to Asia, they puzzled, when it had actually never left.

Asian critics of the pivot also emerged, viewing the policy as overly-antagonistic toward China, and likely to fuel great-power rivalry, which might force regional states into an unwanted binary choice. Oddly, this saw the same Southeast Asian states that had back-channelled requests for greater US presence in the region voice disquiet as the policy was rolled out, fearing a Chinese backlash. This was not long in coming, as Chinese officials and media blasted the policy as a euphemism for containment – one they claimed rested on a Cold War, balance-of-power logic. Despite the administration’s insistence that this was not the case, the charge became a handy weapon for Beijing to keep Washington on a back foot as President Obama and others toured the region in April.

In Europe, understanding of the policy was even less apparent. Many US allies viewed the shift with alarm, and despite Hillary Clinton’s claim that the US could ‘walk and chew gum at the same time’, there was a concern that the prioritisation of Asia was at Europe’s expense.

Indeed, the ‘pivot’ represented an unfortunate choice of nomenclature as it implied that the US only had one face, and like a player on a basketball court, would pivot either in one direction or another in order to move up court. This debate caused led to an unfortunate dumbing down of the actual issues behind the policy, and one that led to increased misrepresentations of overall US global strategy.

Attempts to correct this definitional issue foundered in light of the fact that President Obama personally liked the term, leaving American diplomats floundering between the use of ‘pivot’ and ‘rebalancing’. In some ways, the debate came to resemble that which had clouded China’s 2003 ‘Peaceful Rise’ policy, in which China’s efforts to reassure the region backfired when many observed the balance of power connotations in the term ‘rise’. Obama administration officials at the coal face of the policy, such as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Kurt Campbell, worked hard to get the debate back on track by focusing on substantive issues and de-emphasing the policy name on his visits around the region. However, by 2012, the fiscal climate in Washington had begun to deteriorate, sowing new suspicion that Washington could ill-afford the new policy.

The sequestration in 2013 and ensuing budget cuts to the Department of Defense (hitting the Navy particularly hard) have led some, like Senator John McCain, to question the administration’s ability to fund the policy, despite its insistence that such funding was ring-fenced. At a defence industrial event in March 2014, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Katrina McFarland told the audience that ‘the pivot is being looked at again, because candidly, it can’t happen’. Within hours of her remarks, McFarland sought to withdraw them, contacting Navy Times, which was due to publish her comments, with a correction. The unfortunate back-and-forth served only to heighten the gathering suspcioun both within Washington and in the Pacific region that the administration will be unable to follow through on its intentions.

And yet, despite its fiscal challenges, the Obama administration maintains that its efforts in the Asia-Pacific will continue, and despite naysayers, has demonstrated its commitment to the pivot through a major political and military outreach programme. This has included an increase in presidential visits to the region – Obama having carried out more than any other sitting president – significant changes to the country’s defence posture in-region, with new deployments to Australia and Singapore, and an increased American presence in regional fora such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). On top of that, it has sought – with limited success so far – to re-energise its economic relationship with the region through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

However, despite all of this, perhaps critics of the pivot are right in one way: US attention to the region cannot come at the expense of others. As the economies of the Asia-Pacific grow, for example, so too do their dependence on Middle Eastern energy supplies, linking the security of the two regions. The US will therefore have to adopt a more holistic approach to its global strategy and continue trying to co-ordinate with its allies to establish what each can do, and where they can best do it. The pivot to Asia cannot leave behind security of the Middle East, when so many of its Asian and European allies depend on the region for their energy supplies.

US allies in Europe and in Asia can play a constructive role in developing and implementing this linked-up strategy, as a loose bloc to defend and augment the current rules-based order. Indeed, there have already been some nascent signs of this as allies in the Asia-Pacific have become more integrated into NATO missions in the Middle East and the Gulf of Eden, and in Brussels. There have also been signs of European allies integrating politically with Asian powers. Further institutionalised co-operation between these states and NATO is a good way forward, also helping to build up capacity in key target areas, like cyber-security and maritime security. This has already begun – on a limited capacity – between key US allies like the UK, Australia, and Japan.

Those European allies pushing for the US to recommit to Europe will also have to put their own houses in order and recommit to NATO spending targets, despite the recession. The fact that last year the US accounted for more than 73 per cent of all NATO defence spending (up from 68 per cent in 2007), is a sorry state of affairs that simply cannot continue. The US simply cannot carry the weight of all of its allies.

European allies will also have to acknowledge Asia’s importance in US global strategy; after all, Asia – as the future centre of the global economy – is becoming more important to them too. As such, in addition to taking on more stepping up in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean, they should help to free up those US assets that are needed in Asia. They can also adopt a more co-ordinated approach towards defence exports to China – one more in line with a broader Western strategy. Meanwhile, another little acknowledged facet of China’s build-up has been its use of European military technology, acquired in civilian joint ventures with firms like Eurocopter, Agusta Westland and Pratt & Whitney. The US should not have to deal with advanced European systems in its bid to maintain stability and a balance of power.

Finally, US strategy in the Asia Pacific region must continue to try to manage the Thucydidean trap presented by China’s rise by careful hedging, combining political engagement with hard balancing. Whether referred to as a pivot, rebalance or something else entirely, Washington must pursue policies that strengthen its Asian allies, including new models of security co-operation, while also trying to deter China from military revanchism. If one compares this period to the 1930s, when Western liberal democracies and the League of Nations were in disarray, one might see that the cards are stacked more in the Western power’s favour. Unlike in that period, the US is fully and proactively committed to the defence of global stability, and its allies – though in financial straits – are co-ordinated and committed to the same. Going forward, this generation must not repeat the mistakes of the past and lose sight of the need to defend the current rules-based order

Jeremy S. Maxie

Energy & Political Risk Consultant

In Pace

Peace in Korea and beyond

southseaconversations 讨论南海

China comments on the South (China) Sea disputes

Christopher Phillips

Academic, Writer, Commentator

tokyocooney

(does america)

Philosophical Politics

political philosophy of current events

Minh Thi's blog

pieces of me

North Korea Leadership Watch

Research and Analysis on the DPRK Leadership

National Post

Canadian News, World News and Breaking Headlines

Quartz

Quartz is a digitally native news outlet for the new global economy.

TIME

Current & Breaking News | National & World Updates

Moscow-on-Thames

Sam Greene - London & Moscow

kirstyevidence

Musings on research, international development and other stuff

The Rights Angle

Francesca Pizzutelli's blog on human rights and human beings

Bayard & Holmes

If you're in a fair fight, you're using poor tactics

Grand Blog Tarkin

A roundtable of strategists from across all space and time.

Sky Dancing

a place to discuss real issues

Oscar Relentos

Welcome to my catharsis

mkseparatistreport

A Blog Focused on Bringing Policy and Chinese language Translations Relating to Separatists and Terrorism

playwithlifeorg

4 out of 5 dentists recommend this WordPress.com site

Variety as Life Spice

“Man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask and he will tell you the truth.” - Oscar Wilde

Foreign Policy

the Global Magazine of News and Ideas

Top 10 of Anything and Everything!!!

Animals, Gift Ideas, Travel, Books, Recycling Ideas and Many, Many More

Eleanor Yamaguchi

Specialist in Japanese History and Culture

ABDALLAH ATTALLAH

Futurist | Disruptor | Coach | Reformer

Anglo-Japan Alliance

A new type of alliance

Small House Bliss

Small house designs with big impact

Europe Asia Security Forum

European perspectives on Asian security, and vice-versa

Shashank Joshi

Royal United Services Institute | Harvard University

secretaryclinton.wordpress.com/

A PRIVATE BLOG DEVOTED TO FOREIGN POLICY & THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Adventures in (Post) Gradland

Thoughts on life after the PhD

springdaycomedy

Just another WordPress.com site

James Strong

Junior academic working on British foreign policy

Justice in Conflict

On the challenges of pursuing justice

Politics: Middle East

an analysis of the contemporary middle east

Sino-NK

Sino-NK is a research website for Sinologists and Koreanists.