Discussing NATO Brussels Summit
BBC World, 25 May, 2017
Discussing NATO Brussels Summit
BBC World, 25 May, 2017
Evidence, UK Parliament, 28 April, 2017
1. The UK’s China policy under the former government was based on a number of erroneous assumptions that predicate that (i) Chinese economic growth is certain and sustainable, (ii) that Chinese investment into the UK was an unalloyed good; and that (iii) there are few political risks to engagement to China; and (iv) that China is a status-quo power which desires only modest changes to the current global order.
2. Western debates about rising power China have long been divided between those who emphasize engagement and the transformative side of trade and those who emphasize China’s autocratic government, human rights record, and assertive foreign policy (particularly over its near maritime space). Over the past ten years, there has been a gradual shift as China watchers have begun to adopt a more critical view of China’s foreign policy behaviour, which has been particularly strong among foreign policy elites in the United States, Japan, and other regional (Asian-Pacific) powers. Despite this shift, most diplomacy seeks to hedge against the risks inherent in China’s rise, carrying out both engagement and balancing behaviours. While many in the mainstream insist that this is the best means of maintaining peaceful and stable relations with China, this ambiguity may be ultimately ineffective, and even counter-productive to both UK national interest and to defending a rules-based international order.
3. By this reading, the current spate of tensions between Washington and Beijing are down to the unpredictability of the new Trump administration, and the UK should not or cannot afford to become involved. While these three assumptions still define bilateral ties, they are becoming less and less valid and should be reviewed in the light of changes inside China and in China’s foreign policy behaviour. This submission examines the bilateral under the following propositions:
• The UK cannot afford let trade define the relationship with Beijing, despite the pressures of Brexit, instilling instead a policy of “cautious engagement”
• The UK should not develop too strong a dependency on Chinese trade, given the structural weaknesses of its economy, such as slowing growth, uncertain financial reporting methods, the property bubble, the continued dominance of state owned enterprises (SOE), and the large national debt to GDP ratio. There is a potential for sudden shocks.
• The UK must also consider the costs and risks of Chinese investment inside the UK.
• The UK must reconsider the proposition that economic interdependency is making China into a “responsible stakeholder”. In key ways, it has not.
• The UK must realize that Chinese actions in the South China Sea (and Asia Pacific more widely) are bound to effect the UK. The idea that the UK can stand aside as a major power attempts to control a major Europe-Asia trade route is misguided and counter-productive to UK national interests.
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The Telegraph, 27 April, 2017
The ongoing crisis in Northeast Asia continues to creep toward a possible flashpoint this week, as North Korea holds one of the largest military drills of conventional war fighting. China and Russia have both mobilized troops on North Korea’s border, though in support of the North, or in anticipation of refugee outflows, is uncertain. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has continued pushing forward its China strategy of solving this 4th North Korean Crisis.
First, it has continued to hint at the possibility of military action by testing a Minuteman III ICBM – a pressure point, one dearly hopes, for its diplomacy. Second, it has sought support for its strategy domestically, by undertaking an unprecedented briefing for the entire Senate at the White House. Third, and finally, it has opened up space for a possible resolution in the United Nations Security Council, where the United States currently holds the presidency.
As many experts have already said, the fact is that Korea is the land of bad options. We have all read how terrible a conflict on the Peninsula would be, both because of the large size and relative sophistication of the forces arrayed against each other.
North Korea’s apparent indifference to civilian casualties – clearly shown in its recent use of VR toxin in a crowded Malaysian airport – mean that it is likely to use its 13,000 artillery pieces against South Korea’s nearby capital city, Seoul.
The fact that the last conflict on the Peninsula also saw American and Chinese troops fighting for the only time during the Cold War reveals how quickly things could jump to conflict between great powers. On the other hand, it is not clear this is a crisis of Trump’s choosing.
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The Telegraph, 19 April 2017
The situation on the Korean Peninsula has now escalated to a level of crisis last seen during the Korean War. As I have written here, President Trump has decided to approach North Korea as a Chinese problem, demanding the Chinese provide the solution.
In this judgement, he is partly correct in that Beijing has long been the sponsor, ally, and diplomatic friend to the world’s last Stalinist regime. Unlike the United States which stopped a South Korean nuclear programme in 1975, Beijing has shirked its duty regarding its odd ally.
Then, in the Six Party Talks – during the noughties – China behaved like an impartial chairman, assuming that Pyongyang’s growing nuclear strike capability was America’s problem. Finally, under the Obama administration, when Washington was frustrated and exhausted by the North’s bait-and-switch diplomacy and provocations, Beijing fell back on well-worn phrases to “resume talks” and “avoid conflict”.
Subsequently, it has either watered down sanctions in the United Nations, or watered them down at the border, where a large black market economy keeps the isolated regime awash in products, including military hardware.
Trump’s threat of a unilateral strike then is for Beijing as much as it is for Pyongyang. His goal? To make China realise that not stopping North’ Korea’s nuclear programme will have negative consequences for Beijing too.
Interestingly, his gambit also reveals that the only non-military options left on the table are in China’s hands now. As the largest provider of aid and trade with the North, it holds the stongest cards. So, what will the Chinese do? There are really three scenarios…
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Discussing North Korea on Sky News
Sky News, 18 April 2017
The Interpreter, 14th April, 2017,
President Trump knew exactly what he was doing when he announced news of a US military strike on Syria to a stunned Xi Jinping on the final evening of the US-China Summit at Mar-e-Lago last weekend. Trump significantly raised the stakes for China on North Korea, and along with the news that the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group (CSG) had been rerouted from a planned trip to Australia to the Korean Peninsula, it told Beijing that the Administration means business.
It is already apparent that Trump’s North Korea approach is different from any of his predecessors. For one thing, he has eschewed the delicate issue of Chinese support for the rogue regime and essentially asserted that a Chinese problem demands a Chinese solution. Echoing Hwang Jang Yop, one of the most senior defectors from North Korea, Jim Schoff, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace states, ‘Trump needs a lot of help from China to make it (a deal) even potentially viable’.
By ordering the Carl Vinson to the Korean Peninsula in the wake of the Syria strikes, Trump puts his strongest card on the table: the possibility of unilateral military action, a nightmare scenario for China. With wide-ranging capacity to deliver deadly strikes with cruise missiles and air-to-ground munitions, the Carl Vinson and her strike group give Trump leverage that no other American president has applied to the Korean Peninsula. And while a conflict on the Peninsula is a horror scenario, it’s not clear that doing nothing is better. Sitting tight will eventually put the American heartland within range of North Korean nuclear missiles, raising the prospect that Pyongyang will see US nuclear deterrence as checked. This could in turn lead to North Korean adventurism against the South.
Moving the USS Carl Vinson is designed to intensify pressure on China to break out of the current impasse. The fundamental question is how Beijing will react to Trump’s gambit. Will China use its considerable means to stop the North Korea nuclear program – as once the US did with its allies in South Korea and Taiwan – or will it continue to insist that North Korea is somebody else’s problem?
Repeating a well-worn formula, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called for caution, with spokesman Hua Chunying asking all parties to ‘exercise restraint and avoid activities that may escalate tensions’. Such phrases, trotted out after every North Korean provocation or missile test, have been shorn of meaning and indicate China is still playing on the idea that North Korea is someone else’s problem. China has long held that it is unable to put sufficient pressure on Pyongyang because it is fearful that a strong international response towards North Korea’s nuclear program could trigger the regime’s collapse. But while a collapse of North Korea would be a disaster for the Chinese, it is unclear that full sanctions and a unified approach wouldn’t push North Korean leaders to back down long before a collapse occurred.
By holding up the worst-case scenario as the only scenario, China avoids having to deal more stringently with its ally. Yet when the US pressured Seoul to give up its nuclear program in 1975, South Korea did not immediately collapse like a house of cards. So the idea that Kim Jong-un would persist with nuclear weapons in the face of a unified sanctions regime by every major power in Asia is uncertain, to say the least. And Beijing could sweeten the deal by offering Pyongyang an alternative, like the nuclear umbrella that the US offers its allies.
Perhaps Trump’s instinctive approach toward policy will pay dividends. On Monday, a top Chinese envoy on North Korea, Wu Dawei, met with his South Korean counterpart, Kim Hong-kyun, agreeing that both countries would take stronger action if North Korea tested more nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles. Given China’s tendency for vacuous statements, this is a step in the right direction. President Xi urged Trump to pursue a ‘peaceful resolution to the tensions’ during a phone call the two leaders made on Wednesday. Such rhetoric can only be due to China taking Trump’s moves on North Korea seriously, at least in part. Trump after all tweeted less than a fortnight ago that he was prepared to act unilaterally against North Korea if it does not come to heel. Whatever China’s doubts, the missile strike against Assad displayed in dramatic fashion that Trump is willing to intervene suddenly in situations that others believe to be frozen and immune to intervention.
Trump may have little time to act. The coming election in South Korea is widely predicted to bring to power a government soft on North Korea. Moon Jae-in, the likely election winner, has said no military action can be conducted without South Korean consent and that ‘South Korea should be the owner of North Korean issues’. This is meant to signal that Moon does not want either the US or China to take control of the North Korean problem, an understandable position given Seoul’s fate if military conflict does take place. Trump’s policy pushes the ball into Beijing’s court, not Seoul’s, and this will rankle with the left-of-centre Moon.
North Korea has reacted with predicable outrage both to America’s Syria strike and the deployment of the carrier group. It has called the attack on Assad ‘absolutely unpardonable’ and claims it is ready for war with the US if provoked. A spokesman from the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the ‘sudden’ dispatch of the carrier task group to the peninsula is evidence that Washington’s ‘reckless moves of invading the DPRK have reached a serious phase of its scenario’. There is no doubt that the presence of the carrier group will make North Korea feel extremely vulnerable in coming days. The danger is, of course, that it acts pre-emptively, as befitting a military and negotiating culture that has been honed under immense pressure.
All eyes are on Beijing, and the coming weeks will be critical to the course of the Korean confrontation. This month, North Korea marks several major anniversaries, the most important of which, the ‘Day of the Sun’ on 15 April, is the birthday of the state’s founder Kim Il-Sung. Significant anniversaries are usually celebrated with demonstrations of military might and weapons tests. As the carrier group moves closer to North Korea, one wonders how this day will be commemorated in the last Stalinist state.
The Telegraph, 16 April, 2017
There are two questions which at some point occur to every Western observer of the North Korean government. The first is: are they serious? The second is: are they utterly mad?
Donald Trump’s threat this weekend of a pre-emptive strike if North Korea carries out any new nuclear tests has raised tensions on the peninsula to a level unseen since the Korean War. Many have sought to blame him for it. But in truth, the so-called Democratic People’s Republic has made such a confrontation inevitable with its persistently outrageous behaviour.
For this rogue state it is not enough to threaten the world with nuclear war. Nor is it enough to bombard us with hyperbolic language, such as the promise last year to turn South Korea into a “sea of fire”. No, North Korea also seems to lack the moral compass of even the most hardened criminal states. It has, to list only a few transgressions, mass-produced and smuggled illegal narcotics through its diplomatic carrier bags; counterfeited international currencies on an industrial scale; abducted non-Korean citizens to help train its spies; been implicated in the black market arms trade; and carried out high-profile assassinations in other countries.
For most Europeans the concept of the concentration camp seems a dark relic of history, but according to a UN report there are 80,000 to 120,000 inmates still languishing in North Korean camps as you read these words.
It is tempting to attribute North Korea’s behaviour to crazed ideology. It is the last hold-out of 1930s Stalinism, and some say it out-Stalins Stalin himself. But despite all the trappings of a Soviet state – the “people’s army”, the party bureaucracy, the secret police – it is also a neo-Confucian feudal kingdom, with a leadership in its third generation. It uses a Kantian concept of “willpower” as a mobiliser of the people, pushing its citizens to any sacrifice or hardship and ensuring their compliance with a cradle-to-grave secret police state.
Yet there is method to the madness. The regime’s rhetoric and posturing derives from its origins as a small partisan group, trained by the KGB to fight larger, better equipped foes such as the Japanese army, which brutally occupied Korea from 1910 until 1945.
Donald Trump’s threat therefore fits perfectly in the regime’s narrative. And that narrative leads it to respond to said threats with the most aggressive rhetoric possible. It routinely escalates things to a level no other state would dare. It previously threatened nuclear war in 2013 when the UN Security Council approved new sanctions.
The rest of the world has become used to this behaviour and has adjusted its expectations accordingly. So the answer to the question “are they serious?” is no, not entirely. While we should not dismiss the danger, this is ultimately brinkmanship in the inimitable DPRK style.
Such is the regime’s paranoia, however, that no amount of American diplomacy has persuaded it to let go of its fears. Bill Clinton’s effort in 1994 was said to have been undermined by a secret parallel DPRK uranium enrichment programme. The 2003 Six Party Talks failed because the North Koreans would not allow independent observers to verify the deconstruction of their weapons.
Barack Obama attempted a moratorium on long-range missile tests, but the North Korean diplomats stormed out of the room after learning that their “innocent” satellite launches would also be prohibited. Each time a new US administration has approached the issue, the same regime has been looking back.
Then there is China. Beijing has subtly undermined every Western attempt at diplomacy or sanctions so far, either watering down sanctions at the UN or watering them down at the border where trucks and ships regularly cross as part of a black market which helps sustain the North Korean economy. China has intervened to prevent sanctioning of the companies involved, and recent demonstrations of stopping coal shipments were merely cosmetic. The most egregious example was in 2012, when Chinese-built mobile missile launchers took part in a military parade in downtown Pyongyang in full view of international journalists.
Contrast this behaviour to that of the USA during the Cold War, when it stopped South Korea and Taiwan from obtaining nuclear weapons. For the Americans, China’s reluctance to rein in the DPRK has put regional security in jeopardy. So Mr Trump’s game is clearly to approach this mess as China’s problem, and make it put pressure on its treaty ally – perhaps to halt its nuclear programme.
But would North Korea accept such a deal, even if China were to offer it? Probably not. Seeing the fate of Libya as instructive, North Korean officials point out the dangers in believing in Western assurances. After all, their human rights abuses outshine those of the Gaddafi regime by some measure. Nor is it clear that Kim Jong-un can persuade the military to disarm. While the Kim family is at the top of the pile in North Korea, they buy the military’s support through the Songun ideology, which means “military first” when it comes to allocation of resources. Without it, the Kims cannot govern.
This is the ultimate block to any agreement. Hwang Jang-yop, the most senior North Korea official to defect, once alleged that the military’s primary raison d’être was to unify Korea, by force if necessary. Its generals are true believers in this cause. From that perspective, nukes change everything. With them in play the USA might not risk using its own nuclear weapons if the North invaded the South. So nuclear weapons are essential to maintaining even the ghost of a credible invasion threat – and if Kim Jong-un backed down on that, how long would he last in power?
This is a question we may soon see answered. But it helps explain why the North Korean leadership are at least not completely mad. When it comes to the power of the atom, they are tragically, dangerously sane.
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