North Korea is a terrifying rogue state – but it is its own citizens who suffer the worst 

The Telegraph, 16 February, 2017

The apparent assassination of a North Korean exile, Kim Jong-nam, most likely on the orders of North Korea’s ruler, Kim Jong-un, is the stuff of Cold War-era spy thrillers, an exotic tale that some treat almost as entertainment, not news. Sadly, it is far from fictional, and deadly serious.

It is also part of a pattern: the North goes to extraordinary lengths to murder “traitors”, who have managed to escape the country. One South Korean politician, Ha Tae-keung says that he has reliable intelligence that at least two North Korean assassins are currently in the South seeking to eliminate high-level defectors.

To many in the West, North Korea is all about global security. Missiles and nuclear weapons shape how we think about this hardest of hard authoritarian regimes.

Watch | North Korea ‘successfully’ fires ballistic missile

But what about the North Korean people themselves? In an age of mass demonstrations against the recent US refugee ban, it curious how few in the West demonstrate on behalf of North Korean refugees.

Every year, North Koreans attempt to escape into China, eluding border patrols on both sides. If they survive that ordeal, they face another as they attempt to cross through China to a third country that will grant them passage to South Korea. Lee Hyeon-seo, a defector and author of The Girl with Seven Names, escaped China’s secret police by passing herself off as Korean-Chinese.

She was lucky. Many are caught and forcibly returned and according to a 2014 UN report, face “torture, starvation, forced labour and other gross human rights violations” by North Korean security services.

According to Shin Dong-hyuk, a former labour camp inmate interviewed by the UN Inquiry on Human Rights, attempted escapers are treated like “ploughing animals”. Many “are so weakened from malnourishment and disease that they are literally worked to death”.

A North Korean Woman working in a dimly lit and very old-fashioned silk factory. She is wearing a pink overall with a scarf over her head.  A beam of sunlight just catches her face and forearms
North Korea’s citizens suffer greatly at the hands of the regime Credit: Associated Press

North Koreans are increasingly being sent abroad as a modern form of slave labour. According to Marzuki Darusman, the special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, some 50,000 North Koreans work abroad. Most are in China and Russia, some others are sent to Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Oman, Poland, Qatar, and the UAE. Earlier this month, one such labourer, Choe Myong-bok, was caught hiding in Russia after two decades on the run, and now faces repatriation. He will most likely face the same fate as Ryu En-nam, another defector caught in Russia and sent home in 2008. He was tied to the back of a train and dragged to death.

Under the current leader, many in North Korea – even among Pyonyang’s elites – have begun to despair of things ever improving in the country.

Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power in 2011 was initially greeted with hope by many North Koreans. Under his father, the “public distribution system” of rationing had collapsed during the 1990s famine, leading to the growth of illegal food markets. Many hoped that Kim Jong-un would restore country’s prosperity, but unfortunately such optimism has gradually been dispelled by repeated crackdowns on the illegal markets and the funnelling of state money into crack-pot tourism schemes.

Consequently, a growing number of “privileged” North Koreans have begun to defect. Some allege that this was behind the defection of twelve waitresses from a North Korean state-owned restaurant in Ningbo, China in April last year.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un takes a weapon from a ramrod-upright soldier as he inspects a sub-unit under KPA Unit 233, in this undated photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang January 19, 2017
Kim Jong-Ung inspects his army Credit: KCNA/Reuters

The North Korean regime is a relic, the last of vestige of Stalinism in the modern world. Perhaps its leaders are aware of that; aware that as more of its citizens slip away, the closer the regime’s collapse comes. It is said that North Korea’s leaders watched the lynching of Romania’s last communist leader Nicholae Ceausescu on CNN in a country palace in 1989. Doubtless, that fate is what drives Kim Jong-un’s obstinate refusal to countenance economic reform, his drive for nuclear parity with the US, and his atrocities against his own people.

The geopolitics matter, but we should not overlook those crimes against humanity, or forget the North Korean who people continue to suffer as they strive for a better life


Putting Security into Prime Minister May’s New Industrial Strategy

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The RUSI Newsbrief, 15 February, 2017

Prime Minister Theresa May’s proposed post-Brexit industrial strategy is commendable. However, the UK must avoid the pitfalls of an overly mercantilist policy, especially when it comes to dealing with China.

The UK prime minister’s Green Paper on a new industrial strategy was written ‘to provoke debate’ and ‘start a consultation’ as part of Theresa May’s commitment to make the UK a global leader in free trade. This is a commendable drive to build both post-Brexit prosperity and a post-EU identity for Britain. However, the dangers of developing overly mercantilist policies are ever present and a laissez-faire approach to inbound foreign investment should be avoided, particularly when it comes to foreign ownership of critical national infrastructure (CNI). 

A growing number of autocratic states have become global trading partners, and while this is to be warmly welcomed, it is not without risks. China is of particular note in this regard. China is predicted to surpass the US as the largest cross-border investor by 2020 and has a reputation for large-scale projects and visionary economic planning. Furthermore, the prime minister declared in a recent BBC interview that the ‘golden era’ of UK–China relations is still in place.

Much of China’s economic miracle has been built on leap-frogging technologies, achieved through a mixture of cyber espionage and pushing foreign firms with desirable intellectual property into disadvantageous joint ventures with Chinese rivals. As far back as 2007, MI5 was alerting executives in Britain to the dangers of commercial espionage from Chinese state actors. The 2016 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission asserts that ‘reports of Chinese espionage against the United States have risen significantly over the past 15 years’, noting that while the emphasis has been on ‘defence industrial companies, national security decision makers, and critical national infrastructure entities’. This article reviews three types of Chinese investment into foreign firms.

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North Korea’s ruler routinely assassinates his enemies. But it’s their nukes we should really worry about

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The Telegraph, 14 February, 2017

The scene plays exactly like a Cold War thriller. Kuala Lumpur International Airport is quiet at 8am on a Monday. Two women step behind a middle-aged Korean man pushing a luggage cart, and while one distracts him with a cloth over his face, the other presses a needle into his arm. Then, as he is reeling, they dart off. They have flagged a taxi – likely an accomplice – and are off into traffic before anyone can react to what has just occurred.

Kim Jong Nam, the son of feared ruler Kim Jong-il, and one-time heir apparent, has just been assassinated. The likely culprit is, of course, Kim Jong-un, his step-brother and the current ruler of hardest of hard authoritarian regimes. But why now? Why after years of letting his brother live has he decided to have him killed? And does it have anything to do with last week’s missile test, carried out while Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was visiting President Donald Trump?

The scene plays exactly like a Cold War thriller. Kuala Lumpur International Airport is quiet at 8am on a Monday. Two women step behind a middle-aged Korean man pushing a luggage cart, and while one distracts him with a cloth over his face, the other presses a needle into his arm. Then, as he is reeling, they dart off. They have flagged a taxi – likely an accomplice – and are off into traffic before anyone can react to what has just occurred.

According to one anonymous South Korean diplomat, close to North Korean issues, his death was probably long in the works. After all, in 2012 he had called North Korea’s dynastic succession “a joke to the rest of the world” and had predicted the end of the regime under Kim Jung-un in comments to a Japanese journalist, Yoji Gomi. The source said, “it was probably just his time,” and when asked if the timing related to the missile test, responded: “Maybe Trump is a factor, however North Korea is always driven by its need for internal security.”

This hyper-intense need for security and regime survival has prompted North Korean rulers to use political assassination on quite a few occasions in the past. Often these acts have taken place at home and reveal Byzantine struggles for power between Kim Jong-un and various senior officials who rose to power under his father. Many senior officials have died in “accidents” while driving on North Korea’s empty roads. Kim Yang-gon, a Secretary of the ruling Workers’ Party, died in 2015; Ri Je-gang, first vice department director of the Workers’ Party’s Central Committee, died in 2010; and Ri Chol-bong, Chief Secretary of the Worker’s Party’s Kangwon Provincial committee, died this way in 2009.

The last assassination of a North Korean abroad may have been that of Hwang Jang-yop, the most senior North Korean government official to defect to the South. Found drowned in his bath in Seoul on the 10th of October, 2010 – incidentally, the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Worker’s Party – his death is still classified an accident by the South Korean police. However, the auspicious timing and fact that various attempts on his life had been made before casts some doubt on this.

North Korea has already been in the news this month after firing a Pukguksong-2 (or Polaris 2) medium- to long-range ballistic missile from a mobile delivery system into the Sea of Japan, an event which coincided with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the United States. That gave Abe and President Trump an opportunity to demonstrate unity, with Abe calling the launch “intolerable” and Trump asserting US support of Japan “100 percent”. However, behind such theatrics, the new administration is desperately carrying out a review of the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” policy, a much-maligned approach that was originally meant to allow North Korea’s internal economic contradictions catch up with it.

Pyongyang’s success in developing a long-range nuclear delivery system, capable of hitting the continental US is putting pressure on the process. In a Senate Foreign Relations committee hearing in late January, Korea expert Scott Snyder declared: “Kim Jong-un has decided, based on lessons from Iran, Iraq, and Libya, that North Korea must be too nuclear to fail. Moreover, he intends to threaten the United States with a direct nuclear strike capability.” One could also see this in the tone of US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley in a UN session on February 13th. She fired off a veiled criticism of China in her remarks in the consultations room, calling on North Korea’s “enablers” to ensure that sanctions were fully implemented.

While it is too soon to know if the new policy will focus on China’s relationship with North Korea, the stakes are high. In early January, the Washington Post speculated that Victor Cha, a former North Korea expert in George Bush’s administration. would be appointed to Trump’s. In his 2012 book, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, he asserts: “The next US President will have to deal with a major crisis in North Korea, and potentially unification, before he or she leaves office.” 

Whether or not this occurs – North Korea remains, after all, unpredictable – the world will have to put the country at the top of its list of “things to worry about”.


Don’t Forget the Treatment of North Korean Defectors

The Diplomat, February 14, 2017

With all the outrage over Trump’s refugee ban, where is the anger over Russia and China’s treatment of North Koreans?

In London, thousands of people gathered in the freezing rain to protest the new American president’s ban on refugees from seven Muslim-majority countries.

If people around the globe are willing to protest against Trump’s decision to reject refugees, where is the outrage toward China or Russia, who regularly round up and arrest North Korean refugees inside their borders, and return them to the North? Repatriated defectors sent back to North Korea face harsh penalties. They can be imprisoned in forced labor camps, or face the death penalty by execution.

China

Of North Korea’s two northern neighbors, China has the strictest policy toward North Korean defectors and takes active measures to locate and repatriate any found within its borders. Chinese security services actively cooperate with the DPRK to find, arrest, and repatriate any North Korean refugees who seek to transit China to other neighboring states, and have made it clear to their citizens that assisting the refugees in any way is illegal. Naturally, under those conditions, those North Koreans who do make it to China are extremely vulnerable to trafficking and coerced prostitution.

In the past, if defectors were able to reach foreign embassies and consulates, China has been willing to let defectors leave the country. However, getting to an embassy is often difficult. In a recent undercover documentary filmed by Jake J. Smith entitled While They Watched, a North Korean refugee family was filmed trying to enter the U.S. embassy. Blocked, they then attempted to enter the Japanese embassy next door but were attacked, beaten, and pulled away from the embassy by the Chinese police. They were sent back to North Korea.

Russia

Russia has never been sympathetic to North Korean refugees, granting permanent asylum to only two between 2004 and 2014. However, their repatriation policy was entrenched in 2014, when both countries signed an agreement to forcibly repatriate nationals from either country found to be residing in the other illegally. There are only an estimated 40 defectors that have managed to successfully escape to Russia and remain unnoticed.

The issue of North Korean defectors in Russia gained media attention again after Choe Myong-bok, a defector who has been hiding in Russia for nearly two decades, was arrested last week. He will be forcibly repatriated back to North Korea, despite human rights organizations claiming he faces certain execution if he is returned. Choe is currently awaiting results of an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.

Choe is hoping to avoid sharing the fate of Ryu En-nam, who was forcibly repatriated from Russia back to North Korea in 2008. Once in North Korea, Ryu was dragged behind a train until death.

While some defectors manage to reach Russia from North Korea, often through the Siberian wastes, most North Koreans that become refugees in Russia defect while already working in the country as laborers. These workers are sent to timber and logging camps from Pyongyang with the promise of a better life, in order to earn money to send back to their families. There are an estimated 20,000 North Korean workers in Russia at any one time.

Russia, however, greets these defectors with little more than indifference. If anything, Moscow has strengthened ties to North Korea in recent years, signing an economic agreement only last spring to raise bilateral trade from $112 million to $1 billion by 2020 and laying down plans for a $340 million joint venture to build a new railway from the Russian border to the North Korean port of Rajin. Sadly, while Choe Myong-bok’s story may be the most recent tragic tale, it almost certainly will not be the last.

While one might argue that we hold the United States to higher standards than we do Russia or China, this is a meaningless argument to a North Korean citizen being taken back to be executed. And while Muslim refugees have a range of nearby countries – including Europe itself – where they might instead seek safety, North Koreans have pitifully few choices, with only three borders to choose from.

Our protests are hypocritical and prejudiced if we only seek to defend those who are the fashion of the week. The North Koreans have suffered for generations under one of history’s most brutal regimes and two countries regularly throw them to the wolves. Perhaps someone will light a candle outside the Chinese and Russian Embassies one day to remember these forgotten refugees.


When Theresa May meets Donald Trump, China will the be the elephant in the room

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The Telegraph, January 26, 2017

When the Prime Minister sits down with President Trump on Friday in the Oval Office, she will be in a privileged position. She will the first foreign leader to meet the president since the inauguration. Second, she will be entering “friendly” territory. Already hailed by the President as “my Maggie”, Theresa May will feel a warmth from the President that has been lacking in her recent meetings with European leaders.

Naturally, May will wish to capitalize on his open affection for the “special relationship” and hammer out a new “fair” free trade deal, propelling London to the front of the queue. She will also wish to shore up the President’s support for Nato, a bulwark against Russian revanchivism, by calling for greater European adherence to the 2 percent principle agreed by Nato member states.

What is unlikely to come up – but what should – is China. In some ways, Theresa May and Donald Trump share some concerns towards the rising Asian superpower. After all, the delay over the Hinckley Point nuclear power plant deal, backed by Chinese financing, revealed May’s security concerns over Chinese investment. On the other hand, the Prime Minister’s drive for greater access to the Chinese market may put her at odds with the Trump administration’s increasingly bellicose approach.

While it is still too early to say with certainty how serious the Trump administration is about “confronting” China, the selection of Peter Navarro – author a book called Death by China – to head the newly-created National Trade Council is a clear sign this administration will move against perceived distortions and unfair advantages inherent in the Chinese economy. As state owned enterprises (SOEs) still comprise 40 percent of the economy, these distortions have had a global effect this year, including on European steel.

While a US-China trade war could remain bilateral in the strictest sense, many agree that the fallout would be global, impacting China’s beleaguered RMB, leading to a sudden devaluation of the currency – supposedly a part of the basket of reserve currencies. In turn, this could cause jitters in London’s financial markets. Chinese goods might also increase in price if they were to be tariffed out of the American market, which has been China’s top export market since 2012. On the plus side, May might be able to use the issue to press China for greater market access, increasing British exports to the country.

Trade is not the only issue between the US and China that is set to explode this year. The South China Sea has long been a slow-burn issue for the two, but now appears to be leading to crisis. When Secretary of State appointee Rex Tillerson asserted that…

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Trump’s bromance with Putin will split the West in Two

CNN, December 19, 2016

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When the Financial Times and Time magazine both named President-elect Trump as their person of the year, the publications did so as less of a plaudit and more of a recognition that his election is a pivotal event for the West. Certainly, it represents a major challenge to the shared foreign and security policies of the broad community of nations known as the Western alliance. Only two years after Russia illegally occupied a sovereign nation’s territory in Crimea and then began a proxy war in eastern Ukraine, an American leader has come to power, promising to improve relations with Moscow. How will Trump’s “pivot to Russia” affect European security, and what impact will his increasingly hard line on China have on Washington’s Asian allies? Trump has revealed time and again on the campaign trail — and now, more disturbingly, over the hacking scandal — a willingness to give Moscow the benefit of the doubt.

However, despite his apparent soft spot for authoritarian leaders, Trump has not extended this friendliness to Chinese leader Xi Jinping. In the wake of the Taiwan phone call and the President-elect’s ambiguity over the “One China policy,” the Chinese have responded by flying a bomber over the South China Sea. They have also held life-fire drills on the PLA Navy’s new aircraft carrier and revealed that they are arming their illegal island bases in the South China Sea, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. Then, on Friday, China seized a US underwater drone in the South China Sea. The country used its state media to declare “the drone that emerged from the South China Sea is just the tip of the iceberg in US military strategy on China.” President-elect Trump has responded in the manner to which we have become accustomed, tweeting: “China steals US Navy research drone in international waters — rips it out of water and takes it to China in unpresidented (sic) act” and “We should tell China that we don’t want the drone they stole back.- let them keep it!”

Some commentators, like David Martin Jones in the Telegraph, have wondered if Trump is trying to execute a reverse Henry Kissinger by building ties with Moscow while freezing ties with China. While such a diplomatic move is technically feasible, is it probable? After all, Russian President Vladimir Putin is well positioned at the moment vis-a-vis Beijing. While China has clearly become the dominant partner, and its One Belt, One Road strategy unilaterally consolidates Beijing’s influence over central Asia at Russia’s expense, China has been careful to pay the Russians lip service and accord them the face that Moscow craves. Putin’s ties with China’s Xi Jinping are commonly described as a “bromance,” as the two have met 19 times in four years.

Trade between the countries mushroomed in the wake of Crimea-related Western sanctions against Russia, and the defense forces of the two nations are growing closer. Last September, Russian forces drilled alongside their Chinese counterparts, in apparent support of Beijing’s claims. As a consequence, any ideas Trump may have of splitting the two continental giants should be tempered by reality. We simply aren’t at the position in the Cold War where Beijing and Moscow were eyeball to eyeball and welcomed American balancing. So, if a Kissinger-style swap isn’t on the cards, what are the likely effects of Trump’s new foreign policy? Unfortunately, his policy is likely to exacerbate a tension already running through the Western alliance, in which the European allies — like the EU, NATO member states, and Sweden — balance against Russia while welcoming warm diplomatic and trade ties with China. This is the polar opposite in the Pacific, where Washington and its allies — concerned about Beijing’s intentions in the South China Sea — are attempting to balance against China while improving ties with Russia. While it may not look like much, this split is likely to divide the West in two, while doing little to worry China and Russia.

There are some very real dangers that might arise from this: Europeans might soften on the arms embargo to China, or dampen their criticism of Chinese moves in the Pacific even more than they have already done. Washington, for its part, might undo sanctions on Russia, effectively legitimizing the first territorial invasion of a state by another in post-War history. This would not bode well for the Baltic states.

So, what’s to be done? Well, first it’s a long way to January 20. Trump’s Cabinet is still being picked, and it is difficult to know how much his foreign policy tweets represent the actual future positions of his administration. Furthermore, his administration may yet be challenged– either by the hacking scandal or even by a rejection of Trump’s polices within the Washington policy establishment. US presidents are notoriously dependent on the other branches of government to implement their policies. Any number of things could collide, making Trump a sitting-duck president before he’s even hung his name up in the Oval Office. Regardless of all this uncertainty, neither Americans nor Europeans can afford to ignore the very real possibility outlined above that Trump’s attempt to split the two authoritarian states will actually split the West. Much diplomacy and intra-alliance dialogue will be necessary in the next four years. No less than the future of the liberal, rules-based global order is at stake.

Foreign Investment in Critical Areas like Nuclear Power Need a Formal Vetting Process

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LSE Business Review, October 11, 2016

One of the first decisions taken by Theresa May as prime minister was to delay deciding on the £18 billion Hinkley Point nuclear power project. Because it was a centrepiece project as part of former chancellor George Osborne’s “Golden Age” of closer bilateral ties with China, the issue was instantly politicised, provoking an intense debate in Parliament and across government departments. Defenders of the deal included the Chinese embassy and foreign ministry, which came out publicly to apply pressure on May over the issue.

Meanwhile, those close to the prime minister – formerly home office secretary – pointed out the security risks to Britain’s critical national infrastructure and national security. In the end, a face-saving compromise was reached: the Sino-French consortium would go ahead with the deal with Her Majesty’s Government keeping a majority stake in the company to calm nerves within the security agencies.

The fact that it was a Chinese company which provoked the issue was not incidental: Chinese companies – private and state-owned – have become increasingly active in investing and acquiring businesses and assets in economies across the developed world, particularly in the US (no.1), Australia (no.3), and the UK (no.1 in Europe). In 2014, the FT noted that China’s outbound investment had exceeded its domestic investment and the country was on its way to becoming the world’s largest cross-border investor. As the Hinkley Point debate was flaring up here in London, Australian Treasury Minister Scott Morrison announced that two separate Chinese bids to lease Australia’s largest electricity grid would be blocked for “national security” reasons. It is obvious that May is not alone in her concerns.

To some, China’s focus on infrastructure has a nefarious side: after all, national defence and intelligence agencies depend on critical national infrastructure (CNI) to do their job. To others, China’s focus on CNI is the result of its own domestic economy, which is heavily weighted in favor of big, capital-intensive infrastructure projects. Whatever the case, it is certain that many more private and state-owned Chinese investors will seek to purchase stakes in British companies and infrastructure. Some of these – like stakes in the UK’s hotel industry are clearly benign. Others – like the bid for Global Switch, Britain’s largest data centre, may have repercussions for national security, in the wake of the UK MOD’s move to cloud computing. It may also have privacy concerns as a recent NATO report suggests that China is behind many hacks in the West and is said, by Stratfor, to have the largest domestic mass surveillance apparatus of any country.

Regardless of the answer, the need is clear in the UK for a more formal process than has taken place up until now. Australia and the United States – two of the largest recipients of Chinese investment – have long had treasury-linked agencies to deal with the foreign investment and security: the Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and the Foreign Investment Review Bureau (FIRB).

Naturally, their approach may or may not be a right fit for the UK, which has a strong culture of unregulated investment, but it would benefit both Government and business to initiate some sort of discussion on what is currently a very grey area. Such a review process would calm nerves on both sides – including those of Chinese investors who may have been riled by Hinkley Point. Clearly, Britain wants Chinese investment and even welcomes it within certain parts of the national infrastructure, but not all of its parts. What is most needed, according to Malcolm Rifkind – former Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee – is oversight, “This project went from consideration to contract, without ministers even hearing about it. There must be some sort of accountability with deals of this nature.” Under Rifkind, the ISC produced a strongly critical report in 2013 on the BT-Huawei deal in which BT was supplied components by a company said to have links with the Chinese military.

Prime minister May could best start this conversation in the Cabinet Office and bring members of the security community and business community together in order to hammer out the powers and processes of such a review body. One idea is to make it a committee or subcommittee within the cabinet office, with its own staff. The committee might be composed of business leaders or senior bureaucrats from within relevant ministries, Trade, Treasury, Ministry of Defence and the Home Office. Staffers could be seconded from among these same ministries. Certainly, the Treasury would have to have a large stake in any organization to give it traction, perhaps as Chair. Then there is the question of what it would do: in short, it would create guidelines for firms which operate inside Britain’s critical national infrastructure. It would also investigate adding new areas – particularly those in newly-developing technologies and computing – to areas of sensitivity. Whether it would be given teeth, or simply remain an advisory body – depends very much on whether May can rally her cabinet around the idea to pass legislation in Parliament. Either way, the committee could bring clarity to a gray area.

Creating such a committee makes sense for the UK at the moment. The number of Chinese investments into British infrastructure are only set to rise, and the UK is reconfiguring its EU-dated regulations. While the watchword of the day for many concerned British companies will be “continuity”, this process of rewriting the UK’s legal framework does provide Prime Minister May an opportunity to create a formal review process. Furthermore, a process might remind the UK of the need for investor diversity.

Winnie King, Professor of Chinese International Political Economy at Bristol University states, “The UK needs to frame its approach in terms of Brexit: “Now that we have left the bed of European supra-national governance, we shouldn’t just jump into bed with another big actor. We need to diversify.”

A recent report by the Oxford Review of Economic Policy has challenged some of the myths around Chinese infrastructure projects. The UK has had the fastest growing economy in the Group of Seven for the past four years. It deals in high value, not high volume goods, and its manufacturing includes luxury smart high-tech firms like McLaren, Deep Mind, and others. Britain has remained competitive and in the top 10 global economies by remaining open to foreign investment: a review process will not change that. But it will make future investment more open-eyed and transparent.

Jeremy S. Maxie

Energy & Political Risk Consultant

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